Introduction
War is not a relation between men, but between States; in war, individuals are enemies wholly by chance, not as men, not even as citizens, but only as soldiers.
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In these well-known and much-quoted lines from Du contrat social (1762), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) associated the growing control of the State over war to its humanisation. Because war is the business of princes and governments, it should only concern the State's agents and not its citizens. While this was and remains a noble thought, it is hardly an accurate statement of reality for the Ancien Régime, or for any other period.
During the late 17 th and the 18 th centuries, the laws of war increasingly distinguished between combatants and noncombatants. This was consequential to the growing control of the sovereign princes of Europe over their armed forces. Between the early and late 17 th century, the military entrepreneur had to make way at the head of the prince's armies for the officer, commissioned and paid for by the sovereign. In many countries, a vast bureaucracy was set up to organise, finance, provision, command and -most relevant for our subject -discipline the armed forces. All this contributed to the further professionalisation of war and set soldiers apart from civil society. 3 In this respect, the monopolisation of war by central governments was conducive to humanising war. But by no means was it a sufficient cause thereof. The association of State control and citizen's immunity might have some conceptual validity for the era of the dynastic State, once the nation-State emerged, the association worked the other way round. Now that the nation became the State, the State's war also became the nation's war. The total wars of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era and of the 20 th century speak all too loudly for themselves.
But even for the era of the dynastic State, the bond between State control and the limitation of war holds only partially true. Growing State control did not only lead to less total war; in some respects it also led to more total war. Rousseau's words might, rather unwillingly as far as he was concerned, reflect reality in as much as they referred to the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, this by no means implied that citizens 4 remained aloof from the sufferings of war. Although the laws and customs in some ways and circumstances aimed at protecting them from bodily harm, in the dynastic State the prince's war was also the war of his subjects. If they did not have to die in it, they surely had to pay for it -into their own, or the enemy's treasury. The mobilisation of their resources for war was one of the most crucial factors of success or failure for the princes and republics of earlymodern Europe; during war, the capture or destruction of the enemy's resources was as much.
The Military Revolutions of the Early-Modern Age were ever so many rounds in that vicious circle of the expanding machinery of State and rising costs of war, in every sense of the word.
The Enlightenment did nothing to change that. 
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of war was discriminatory. On principle, only one side could have justice on its side and be fighting a just war. Consequentially, the benefits of war -the iura belli, as the right to conquer or plunder -only befell one side. Also, a just belligerent could only take from the enemy that to which he held a claim of restitution, compensation or vindication.
During the 16 th and 17 th centuries, the legal conception of war changed. Whereas the just war doctrine proved resilient in that belligerents continued to justify war in terms of its justice for the benefit of their and their enemy's allies and subjects -as well as their own conscience -, 5 a second conception of war emerged. It was the concept of legal war -which Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) labelled solemn war. 6 For a war to be legal it had to be waged between sovereign powers and it had to be formally declared. This last condition indicated its ratio existendi. Whereas the justice of war was by and large a matter of religious morality as well as political propaganda, its legality had roots and ramifications in the practice of warfare.
The declaration of war by a sovereign prince, having the authority to do so, indicated that from now on, a legal state of war reigned between the belligerents and their subjects. By consequence, the laws of peace -or at least, many of them -were superseded by the laws of war, and for third parties, of neutrality. Indeed, by the early 17 th century, war was no longer perceived of as a set of different acts of hostility but as a condition, a state, highly different from the state of peace, that suspended most if not all normal relations between the belligerents. The state of war was to be ruled by the laws of war and of neutrality, which were much more encompassing than the iura belli of the medieval ius gentium. Indeed, it allowed for more involvement of noncombatants as traditional medieval just doctrine would. In some sense, the growing distinction between combatants and noncombatants from the late 17 Sixth, enemy as well as neutral goods were often confiscated because of infringements against trade restrictions. Seventh, as a logical complement to trade restrictions between belligerents, the payment of debts to enemy creditors was often suspended. Sometimes, the debtor had to pay his debts into his own treasury. This amounted up to a kind of sequestration or confiscation of the debt.
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As war became a practically and legally more encompassing state of affairs, peacemaking became more complex. The stipulations of early-modern peace treaties can be classified in three groups. First, there were the political concessions made and won by the signatories. These often, if not always, entailed a settlement of the claims and issues for which the war had been waged. The settlement exhausted the right to resort to war over these issues in the future. Second, the treaty regulated the return from the state of war to the state of peace.
Particularly on this point, early-modern peace treaties became quite elaborate. most contentious points regarded some territorial issues, the position of the Catholic religion in the countryside around 's-Hertogenbosch that was to be ceded to the Republic and the closure of the river Schelde. To the articles relating to private property, the Spanish made only minor remarks and amendments, many of which were later dropped. The Dutch draft was, as the instruction of the Estates-General, largely based on the Twelve Years Truce. Early July 1646, members of the two delegations initialled the Articles of the draft treaty on which consent had been reached.
In September 1646, the States of Holland proposed to convert the truce negotiations into peace negotiations. The motion was carried in the Estates-General and the Spanish were keen to accept this change. The draft treaty only had to undergo minor changes and adjustments, and only a few more articles were added to the text -which, in the end, would consist of 79 articles. The conversion was prepared by the Dutch delegation to Münster. By 27 December, the two delegations reached an agreement on the text. Whereas after that date, some more points -particularly in relation to territory and religion -arose and had to be cleared between the Dutch and the Spanish, it were not these that stalled the conclusion of the peace for another year. The Spanish from their side were more than keen to reach an agreement. Although they put up a fight over some issues, they were most willing to make concessions and did so on most contentious points. When the negotiation process leading up to the conference in Westphalia first started in the early 1640s -after the plans for a similar conference at Cologne from 1636 had failed -, Spain was fighting no less than four major wars: the Catalan and Portuguese rebellions (both since 1640) and the wars with the Dutch Republic (since 1621) and with France (since 1635). Moreover, as an auxiliary to the Emperor, Spain was also involved in the Thirty Years War in the Holy Roman Empire. In 1647, a rebellion against the Spanish broke out in Sicily and in Naples. By 1645, it was clear to most in the Madrid government that any agreement that would knock the Republic out of the war was a victory in itself.
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That it took two years for peace to be achieved, was in the end less caused by any difficulty in the negotiations between the Dutch and the Spanish delegates at Münster, than by two other factors. In the first place, there was the reluctance of some Dutch provinces, particularly Zeeland, to make peace with Spain. 28 In the second place, the Dutch Republic was bound by treaty not to make a separate truce or peace without its main ally, France. Israel, Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World (note 16), 387-8. 40 As mentioned above, a general restitution was not to be. Only the properties and rights mentioned in Article 25
to 28 had to be returned; for the rest the separate agreements stipulated compensation. 
Seizure and restitution
If most early-modern peace treaties were rather elaborate with regards to the restitution of Why was the dual principle of restitution of realty and non-restitution of personal and lapsed income preferred? What were its implications? For both dimensions of the principle we will first have a look at the doctrinal context, and then search for the pragmatic reasons for which this dual principle was adopted.
The late 16 th and early 17 th centuries saw the emergence of an autonomous doctrine of the law of nations. Modern scholars often use historical scholarship as a kind of convenient shorthand for the law of nations as it was at a certain time. Certainly for the period studied here one should be careful with this. As the Cambridge international lawyer Thomas Alfred
Walker had it, the great scholars who wrote treatises on the law of nations of the EarlyModern Age offered at best 'second-hand' information on the law of nations from their day and age. 59 Indeed, their purpose was rather to prescribe the law than to describe it. And although at times they had some impact, their success in prescribing the law should surely not be overstated. Still, it is useful to study these authors to gain insight into international legal practice. First, the authors of the late 16 th and 17 th centuries were certainly not positivists yet, but they did, increasingly so as humanism had its impact felt, make references to historical and, rather less so, current practices. In this, they were highly selective in order to corroborate their views. Their testimonies were indeed often 'second-hand,' but they were nevertheless testimonies. Even when trying to impose their views on the readership, authors had to make genuflexions to reality. Second, and more significantly, they shared the same intellectual tradition and basic scholarship as the diplomat-jurists who negotiated the treaties. That was the great medieval tradition of the ius commune of canon and civil law, which was studied all 66 For Gudelinus, its presence in the Corpus iuris civilis offered the opportunity to teach on peace treaties and to write a treatise on the subject. While placing it in the tradition of the ius commune, he also clearly drew on existing practice.
Therefore, his treatise is important to us for two reasons. It stands within the tradition of the learned ius gentium and thus reflects what the civil law trained jurist-diplomat might be supposed to have learned -as to some extent does Gentilis' work. Furthermore, it reflects existing practice. 67 All of these authors had benefited from some exposure to civil law at the university -Grotius, who graduated in civil and canon law at Orléans at the age of 15 without having studied there, least of all.
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The treatises touched upon two questions which are relevant for our purpose. Ayala extended this to the usufruct of that land. 70 This rule implied that when the enemy had occupied a certain territory and taken, possibly by confiscation, somebody's land, it would automatically return to the original owner when the enemy was driven out. The rule also applied to large vessels and transports, such as ships, as well as some horses. 71 Gentilis was concurrent with Ayala to the effect that immovables fell under postliminium. He argued that one could never be reproached for having surrendered his lands to the enemy as they could not be taken to safety. Postliminium only covered losses suffered involuntary during the war.
Therefore, deserters did not benefit from postliminium. 72 Grotius agreed that lands were restored by postliminium, both under Roman and current law. 73 The same went for all rights annexed to the land. 73 Grotius, De iure praedae (note 62), 10; idem, De iure belli ac pacis (note 6), 3.9.13.1. 74 Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis (note 6), 3.9.13.2.
ius postliminii in pace in a very different way. In their view, the issue seemed to boil down, inasmuch as property was concerned, to the question whether a peace treaty automatically implied the restitution of all property -or at least property liable to postliminium -even without an express stipulation to that effect.
With the two authors who addressed that question, the answer was in the negative.
Gentilis opened his chapter 'De agris & postliminio' with the words 'that they [territories, places, and buildings] all remain in the power of the man who holds them at the time when peace is made, unless it has been otherwise provided by the treaty.' 75 For Gentilis, it was clear that postliminium pertained to the laws of war, and thus to the state of war. It was a right from which benefited people who had suffered losses because of the war, and which was won by acts of war -such as fighting or escaping the enemy. 76 Gudelinus, too, rejected automatic restitution on the basis of postliminium in pace, expressly attacking the opinion of Accursius to the opposite. For restitution to take place, it had to be expressly stipulated. 77 At another place, Gentilis had also held that what had been taken in the war, also from private persons, remained taken unless the peace treaty stipulated otherwise. 78 Grotius did not address the question in terms of postliminium in pace, but his conclusion in terms of contemporary peace treaty practice was to the same effect. In relation to the position of property taken by the enemy during the war, he stated that there were two 75 solutions: return to the old, pre-war situation or the application of uti possidetis. He was of the opinion that, if nothing was stipulated, the presumption was to the latter.
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In conclusion, we can say that there reigned a broad consent. They held to the opinion that, whereas land -and rights attached to it -fell under postliminium, there was no automatic restitution when peace was made. In order for restitution to take place, it had to be expressly stipulated. They all agreed, however, that peacemakers had a right to do so.
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A second relevant issue on which the authors shed their light concerned the right to take property from the enemy in general, and confiscation in particular. To begin with, there was widespread consent that according to the laws and customs of war, anything belonging to the enemy and his subjects could be taken during the war. 81 As this was a right, which could be exercised in any 'legal war' -meaning a war waged by a sovereign and formally declared -, it pertained to all belligerents, regardless of the justice of their cause.
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Among the authors studies here, Grotius was most explicit in distinguishing between the positive law of nature -which he labelled volitional -and the natural law of nations, the precepts of natural justice as applied to States. 83 But Ayala and Gentilis as well confronted elements of positive and natural law with one another. In relation to the laws of war, this meant that they all discussed both elements of just and of legal war. 84 Whereas the positive laws of war made all enemy property liable to capture, the rules of natural justice mitigated this. The general view was that one could only take so much property of the enemy as was just. 85 For Grotius, there were three reasons that could make the destruction or capture of enemy property just: out of necessity, to settle a debt or the inflict -a proportional -punishment for injury. 86 Translated to the context of warfare, necessity meant that one could take from the enemy everything which weakened his ability to fight the war and thus furthered one's chances to victory. 87 As the necessity ended with the war, goods taken for this reason needed to be either restored in kind or, otherwise, compensated.
39 prince before the war and which, possibly, formed the issue, or one of the issues, for which the war was fought. It also entailed claims to compensation for damages inflicted during the war as well as for the costs of waging the war. Compensation for war damages, of course, pertained to the sphere of the just war doctrine. It assumed that one of the belligerents had a right to wage the war and the other not. By consequence, all damages inflicted by the unjust side were considered to be the result of unjust actions. Therefore, the unjust side was liable to compensate them. The same reasoning went for the cost of waging a just war against an unjust belligerent.
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According to Grotius, the just belligerent should, ideally, 'obtain that for which he took up arms, and should likewise recover for damages and costs.' 90 But as it was not customary for a signatory party to a peace treaty ever to concede that he had waged an unjust war, this rule remained ineffective. Property was either kept under the rule of uti possidetis, or mutually returned.
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With these remarks, Grotius faithfully described the practice of his day and age and illuminated the doctrinal background for it. Restitution clauses in late-medieval and earlymodern peace treaties were closely linked to another clause, that emerged around the same time and had become a standard clause of almost every peace treaty by the 17 th century: the clause of amnesty and oblivion. 92 This clause implied that all acts committed during and because of the war were remitted and that no claims could be laid because of crimes or injuries committed because the war or of damages inflicted because of the war. These clauses were congenial to the silent acceptation, which was a fundamental feature of almost all latemedieval and early-modern peace treaties, that both parties had held a right to wage the war. 89 Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis (note 6), 3.2.2 and 3.13.2-3; also see idem, De iure praedae (note 62), 4. 90 Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis (note 6), 3.20.11.2. See also Vitoria, De iure belli (note 85), 3.7.1. 91 Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis (note 6), 3.20.12.1. 92 Art. 4 of the Peace Treaty of Münster.
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In not a single peace treaty of the 16 th to 18 th centuries between European powers an attribution of guilt for the war or a judgment on the justice of this or the other side can be found. 93 As both sides were considered to have held the right to wage the war, their actions were covered by the legality of the war, or of its presumed justice.
But the overlap between Grotius' doctrine and practice did not end there. Earlymodern State practice reflected the ambiguity which Grotius had caught in his distinction of just and solemn -or legal -war, of the natural and the volitional law of nations. Throughout most of the Early-Modern Age, princes and Republics in their declarations and manifestos of war, as well as in treaties of alliance, continued to use the discourse of just war in justifying their actions to their subjects, their allies, their enemies, and ultimately, their conscience. This implied that they, at least implicitly but mostly explicitly, took the stance that they had right on their side and were thus pardoned for resorting to war, while their enemy was not. This discriminatory conception of war also spilled into the measures taken against the enemy. Seizures and confiscations of property thus shared in the ambiguity of just and legal war. Enemy property -whether found in one's own territory at the start of the war or seized later in conquered lands -was seized. Whereas the laws and customs of war condoned this, justice, too, sanctioned it, but only for the just belligerent. Princes and governments liked to cloak their actions in the mantle of justice. But once peace was made, these claims to justice were abandoned. According to doctrine, as to logic, confiscations were made either to weaken the enemy, as a security for his debts or as punishment. By consequence, the peace treaty destroyed their very foundation. Ending the war meant that there was no further justification to weaken the enemy. The belligerent's claims that lay at the roots of the war were either settled in the treaty, or reserved for the future without them being adjudged. The absence of any attribution of guilt to any of the belligerents meant that they would not be punished for the war. And, finally and most importantly, the amnesty clause took away the foundation for confiscation as a security for the compensation of war damages.
The question now remains open why restitution did not extend to movables and income on realty lapsed before the conclusion of the peace treaty. For this, doctrine gives some clues. It is not the time and place here to delve deeply into the intricate arguments made by the historical writers on the capture of movables. Let us suffice with three general remarks.
First, under the civil law, the conditions for a possessor to become owner of a movable good are far less demanding than for realty. 95 In his magnum opus of 1758, Vattel would expressly state that the title to personal property was transferred by its capture. Second, this distinction from private law found its reflection into the laws of capture and plunder. The traditional view was that whereas movables became the property of the captor -at least once they had been safely brought within the lines -, land became public property. It was acknowledged that, historically as well as currently, princes and military commanders held the right to put these rules aside and impose their own rules. 97 Government control was a particular point of interest during the Early-Modern Age. As governments tried to enhance military discipline, they also tried to increase their control over the division of the spoils of war. 98 Moreover, whereas an owner lost his title to his movable property once it had been brought within enemy lines, for the title on realty to be lost, more needed to be done.
Classical doctrine held that the land had to be fortified and protected by fortifications. 99 In reality, title was only taken from the original owners through the official act of confiscation.
Third, not all movables were considered to fall under postliminium. Classical Roman law only applied postliminium to some categories of movables. The early-modern writers studied here all supported the view that, with some exceptions for goods useful in war such as warships, transports and some horses, movables did not return to the original owner upon 96 Vattel, Le droit des gens (note 10), 4.2.22. 97 Ayala, De Jure et Officiis Bellicis (note 61), 1.5.3-9 and 1.5.37; Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis (note 6), 3.6.3-
